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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) can foster dynamic, efficient, and innovative solutions for 
tomorrow’s warfighter by structuring acquisition portfolios that deliver an integrated suite of 
capabilities. Such portfolios would permit execution of many core acquisition elements and 
processes at a level above the individual program to enable enterprise management, 
economies of scale, and faster capability deliveries. While large DoD programs navigate the 
acquisition life cycle individually, large commercial businesses manage integrated product 
lines for items ranging from automobiles and personal electronics to software and health 
services. The portfolio framework proposed in this paper establishes broader entities that 
involve an active government and industry community throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
Portfolios would scope programs and increments from high-priority requirements, mature 
technologies, and rigorous analyses covering a comprehensive mission area. Portfolio 
strategies, roadmaps, and architectures would guide development of a suite of smaller 
programs, allocating budgets, personnel, and other resources dynamically to the highest 
priority efforts. Reorganizing from a product-based model to a portfolio model would enable 
more successful and faster delivery of integrated mission capabilities. 
Introduction 
Challenges of the Program-Centric Acquisition Model 
In today’s defense acquisition system, each program navigates the acquisition life 
cycle individually. This results in an acquisition enterprise that leads to stove-piped 
solutions, long acquisition cycles, and a highly inefficient use of resources. Initial conceptual 
requirements drive program scope and budgets, yet often inappropriately constrain the 
solution space for long-term programs that develop major systems. The lengthy 
congressional approval process for new start programs contributes to setting a high bar up 
front to DoD exploration of new solutions.  
Developing systems individually makes it extremely challenging to deliver the 
integrated, net-centric systems and services required for the DoD’s complex and dynamic 
operations. Acquisition programs design, develop, test, and produce isolated systems that 
must meet a defined set of requirements within an allocated budget. Analyses of alternatives 
(AoAs) occur at the program level, with minimal consideration of enterprise performance, 
                                            
 
 
1 Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Case Number 15-0862. © 2015 The MITRE 
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costs, or risks. Each program must conduct its own research and development (R&D) to 
mature its critical technologies in order to begin development (see Figure 1). 
 
 
Guiding large systems through the acquisition life cycle over a period of 10–20 years 
has proven inefficient and ineffective as technologies, operations, and budgets change. 
Selecting a development contractor alone takes a year or longer, and in the process 
programs often lose critical insights that could be gained from subsystem prototypes and 
preliminary designs. As other nations rapidly adopt commercial technologies and exploit 
global networks, the DoD’s technological advantage confronts greater risk.  
In the years 2001‒2011, the DoD spent over $46 billion on Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) that were ultimately canceled (Harrison, 2011). A major 
contributing factor common to these failures is that the programs tried to do too much at 
once: they used a big-bang approach to develop and integrate a wide array of technologies 
to meet all envisioned requirements. For example, the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) 
attempted to develop a dozen classes of ground systems, unmanned aerial and ground 
vehicles, and an integrated network as a single MDAP; FCS was cancelled after spending 
$18 billion. The Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) sought to 
replace over 250 legacy logistics information technology (IT) systems with a single new 
system and invested $1.1 billion and nearly a decade of effort before program cancellation 
(Levin, 2014).  
The DoD’s acquisition budget has been reduced by tens of billions of dollars annually 
from the levels of the previous decade. The DoD’s fiscal year (FY)2015 research and 
procurement budgets alone have declined by 21% and 29%, respectively since FY2010 
(Weisgerber, 2014). In an era of continued global threats, the DoD could lose its 
technological edge unless it takes bold steps to structure and streamline the acquisition 
framework to deliver capabilities to the warfighter more effectively (Kendall, 2014). To 
accomplish this, the DoD must leverage the structure and methods of large commercial 
enterprises, including auto manufacturers, consumer electronics companies, and 
professional services firms, all of which use product lines to obtain the greatest benefits from 
their investments. 
Commercial Product Lines 
Commercial firms use an approach that evolves a product to its ultimate 
capabilities on the basis of mature technologies and available resources. This 
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allows only the product features and capabilities achievable with available 
resources in the initial development. Further product enhancements are 
planned for subsequent development efforts when technologies are proven to 
be mature and other resources are available. (Walker, 2013)  
Many large corporations organize along product lines to leverage economies of scale 
and react swiftly to emerging trends and changes in consumer demands. For example, 
Apple revolutionized consumer electronics because it did not simply develop products that 
outperformed others in the marketplace but focused on delivering a full integrated user 
experience across products and services. Toyota designs, develops, and produces its cars, 
trucks, and SUVs by leveraging technology innovations across all of its models.  
With many Fortune 500 companies facing strong challenges from emerging startups, 
executives are aggressively breaking down corporate silos and reengineering operations to 
pursue innovative solutions. Leading companies embrace “design thinking” that prompts 
them to observe market nuances, experiment with many options, and rapidly prototype 
ideas to bring the best ones to reality. They maintain strategic variety, to include creating 
portfolios of new strategic options, building a magnet for great ideas, and minimizing the 
cost of experimentation (Hamel, 2012). 
Companies designate product line managers to maximize revenue and profit from 
the company’s investments and executives grant these managers significant latitude to 
shape the products they manage. This includes marketing, developing new products, 
forming corporate partnerships, and conducting R&D. The success of a product line 
depends on the company’s ability to track the market closely and react faster than the 
competition to emerging trends, technology advancements, and changes in consumer 
tastes. The success of this strategy, in turn, stems from aligning each product line 
manager’s responsibilities with accountability: Those who perform these tasks effectively 
receive handsome rewards, while those who do not quickly find themselves in a new line of 
business.  
Successful companies continuously analyze market demands, technology 
performance, and resources to optimize their product lines. Competitors quickly integrate the 
key product features of industry leaders into their own designs based on consumer 
preferences and sales forecasts. Short- and long-term investments in R&D, production 
facilities, and support services undergo extensive performance analyses for financial (e.g., 
return on investment), technical (e.g., performance benchmarks), and business (e.g., market 
share) aspects. Businesses invest in data to regularly update and fine tune analytical 
models to support strategic and tactical decisions to maximize revenue, profits, and market 
share. They rigorously identify and prioritize market demands to exploit these opportunities 
with an optimal balance of portfolio solutions. 
Time-to-market represents one of the most powerful drivers in commercial product 
development. Some companies seek to achieve “first mover advantage” by introducing a 
new product into the marketplace. Others then offer products or services with additional 
features, better performance, or a lower price point to gain market share. The more time that 
companies waste on perfecting “the next big thing” the more time competitors have to sell 
their products. Rarely are the best products on the market a business’s first version. Instead, 
an iterative series of competing models usually generates the strongest, innovative 
products, from the current year’s model hybrid car to the latest smartphone. While 
commercial enterprises operate in a different environment, the DoD can adopt many 
valuable private sector practices to structure and execute acquisition portfolios.  
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What Is a Portfolio? 
A DoD portfolio would comprise a collection of programs, projects, increments, and 
related development efforts designed to achieve a set of strategic outcomes. A portfolio 
could expand on the system-of-systems model or span a program executive officer’s (PEO) 
full suite of programs. Many DoD headquarters organizations use portfolio management 
from a functional oversight perspective, rather than on designing integrated solutions. This 
portfolio vision is a more tactical approach to structure acquisition elements above a 
program by those closest to the program execution. 
To avoid the common DoD pitfalls of complexity and bureaucracy, portfolios should 
encompass a small group of related programs, such as those within a PEO’s portfolio. For 
example, IT portfolios could manage a suite of applications and services that run on a 
common infrastructure platform, while aircraft portfolios could leverage a common airframe 
(e.g., C-130) with different payloads for each mission profile. Portfolios could also leverage 
common subsystems across programs, to include engines, sensors, communications suites, 
or avionics software (e.g., Special Operations helicopters). The DoD may find it easier to 
begin with portfolios of programs that are easily divisible, such as IT systems, rather than 
with large programs developing new bombers, ships, or space systems. Over time, if 
successful, the DoD could expand and scale these portfolios.  
Overview of the Portfolio Acquisition Model  
Just as industry has succeeded by applying a portfolio model around product lines, 
the DoD could achieve similar success by structuring and managing acquisition via 
portfolios. This would require decomposing large systems into multiple smaller programs, 
projects, or increments. These portfolios would group related capabilities across programs 
and commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products and services, thereby elevating the time-
consuming acquisition processes to the portfolio level, reducing program workload, and 
allowing programs to deliver products faster (see Figure 2). 
 
 
A portfolio structure can foster innovation to deliver affordable solutions that achieve 
mission outcomes. The DoD would construct programs and increments from federated 
inputs, priority requirements, mature technologies, and rigorous analysis focused on a 
mission area. This would include an active government and industry R&D community 
aligned to advancing technology solutions. Enterprise management via portfolio strategies, 
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roadmaps, and architectures would guide development of a suite of smaller capabilities. 
Dynamic allocation of budgets, personnel, and other resources would lead the DoD to invest 
in the highest priority efforts. Portfolios would extend beyond delivery of an initial capability 
to optimize operations and sustainment of the capability suite.  
Table 1. 12 Major Elements of Portfolio Acquisition 
 
Acquisition Elements 
This section presents details on the acquisition elements shown in Table 1, 
describing the program model (as-is) and offering a vision for a portfolio model (to-be). 
Requirements 
Program Model 
Programs capture initial requirements in an Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) at the 
start of the acquisition life cycle to outline a broad capability gap. They then refine and 
solidify requirements in a Capability Development Document (CDD) that contains key 
performance parameters. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) must approve 
the CDD before system development begins. MDAPs usually take an average of 24 months 
to complete CDDs that in essence lock down the program scope for the next 10 to 15 years 
of development and production (Sullivan, 2015). During this time frame, change occurs 
constantly across operations, threats, priorities, budgets, technologies, and related systems, 
but the requirements remain fixed.  
Operational sponsors often inflate the scope of a CDD by including all known 
requirements, as potential subsequent increment or program would follow many years later. 
This compounds risk by expanding the program scope, the number of critical technologies to 
mature, and variances in estimates, creating longer timelines to achieve initial operational 
capability.  
Portfolio Model 
Given the rapid pace of technology change, the DoD can no longer afford to lock in 
requirements for a decade or more. Instead of attempting to predict long-term operational 
and technical needs prior to defining short-term operational capabilities, programs must 
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focus on incremental advances. Managing via a broader set of portfolio requirements would 
enable greater system interoperability than a series of large, fixed CDDs for major weapon 
systems. 
A dynamic and agile requirements model with users at its center would serve as the 
foundation for effectively scoping programs in a portfolio model (Figure 3). ICDs would cover 
a broad mission or capability area and align with the scope of a portfolio rather than that of a 
single program (Winnefield, 2015). They would be broad documents central to ensuring that 
the operational, acquisition, and intelligence communities align around common outcomes, 
priorities, and expectations. In coordination with operational commands, operational 
sponsors could manage capstone requirements via portfolio ICDs as living documents. This 
would include annual updates to reflect their current concept of operations, strategic 
guidance, priorities, threats, capability gaps, and desired effects. 
 
 
A database or requirements management software would capture the next level of 
portfolio requirements, which many products or services in the portfolio could ultimately 
satisfy. A requirements board and team of operational sponsors would manage the dynamic 
requirements list, reprioritizing it on the basis of operational priorities, threats, and desired 
effects. The acquisition community and potentially industry would translate the items on the 
list into engineering requirements while exploring notional technologies and solutions for 
each. Portfolios would reprioritize and revisit the requirements regularly to ensure increased 
fidelity. The Defense Intelligence Agency could continue to supply inputs on mission and 
system threats as well as adversaries’ current and planned capabilities to help shape and 
prioritize requirements.  
Programs and increments would have a smaller scope than today’s systems. The 
smaller the scope, the easier it would be to analyze, plan, estimate, design, develop, test, 
and produce capabilities with reduced technical and programmatic risks. Portfolios would 
scope the next program or increment on the basis of the highest priority requirements and 
the availability of mature technologies and affordable solutions. Delivering capabilities to 
users faster would reduce risk while responding more rapidly to changes in operations, 
technologies, and budgets. For example, portfolios would seek to deliver weapon system 
capabilities in five to 10 years rather than the 15 to 20 years common today and IT 
capabilities in less than 18 months rather than five to eight years.  
To do so, portfolios would leverage the Joint Staff’s IT Box model, allowing more 
speed and agility in software system requirements (Winnefield, 2015). The IT Box model 
delegates requirements oversight and validation of documents following an ICD to a flag-
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level organization rather than the JROC. Portfolios would streamline and tailor successor 
documents according to the oversight authority and program needs.  
Analysis 
Program Model  
During the Materiel Solutions Analysis (MSA) phase, programs conduct an AoA to 
compare the operational effectiveness, suitability, and life-cycle costs of potential 
alternatives. The Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) director provides guidance 
for major programs and approves the final analysis. AoAs are led by the operational sponsor 
with support from the acquisition community. The analyses often reveal a bias toward 
alternatives that look and feel like the legacy system the new program will replace, but with 
more modern technologies and improved performance.  
Contrary to the perception that acquisition executives stress due diligence in this up-
front analysis, programs often experience pressure to complete the analysis so that they can 
advance to the next acquisition phase in pursuit of the preferred alternative. Once a program 
achieves Milestone A approval, it rarely revisits the AoA to validate constraints and factors 
and ensure that the program is still pursuing the best solution. Programs refine their cost 
estimates in each phase, with the life-cycle costs determined on the basis of tradeoff 
decisions made early on.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio structures would enable robust, integrated, continual analysis to optimize 
cost, risk, performance, and mission impact. Portfolio AoAs would be robust, continual 
processes designed to optimize the performance and/or efficiency of a suite of programs 
over their life cycle. Analysts would regularly assess the portfolio capabilities (fielded, in 
development, and planned) to maximize mission impact and minimize portfolio life-cycle 
costs. In-depth knowledge of technical baselines tightly aligned to cost models would drive 
affordability and trade-space analysis at the program and portfolio levels. Portfolio-level 
modeling and simulation (M&S) and experimentation would optimize system performance, 
operational effectiveness, and suitability. Threat assessments would track adversaries’ 
military capabilities and the risk they pose to U.S. personnel, systems, and national 
interests. These analyses would continuously monitor and evaluate a variety of 
technologies, systems, services, and nonmaterial considerations such as doctrine, training, 
or procedures. Technology advances would drive requirements changes and the resulting 
system capabilities supported by a flexible contract and budget structure. Analyses of 
programs in development would consider their acquisition performance and operational 
priorities to ensure the programs continue to represent worthwhile investments. Data would 
drive the design and adaptation of portfolio capabilities. Divestment analyses would assess 
if and when to terminate a program and what alternative approaches to consider as a way 
forward.  
Research and Development (R&D) 
Program Model 
Programs in the Technology Maturity and Risk Reduction (TMRR) phase focus on 
prototyping and maturing the technology to a point where the program can begin 
development in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Most 
programs today develop the full scope of capabilities to meet all the approved requirements, 
and the resulting systems can take a decade or longer to field. Individual programs are 
responsible for maturing all critical technology elements and demonstrating them in a 
relevant operational environment.  
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Program offices face pressure to transition to EMD as soon as possible so that they 
can deliver capabilities before the requirements and technologies become completely 
outdated. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) regularly criticizes the DoD for 
allowing far too many MDAPs to advance into EMD with immature technologies that create 
cost, schedule, and technical risks (Sullivan, 2014).  
During the TMRR phase, many interested companies may contribute technology 
research and competing preliminary designs. Once a program reaches Milestone B, most 
R&D stops and a single prime contractor develops and produces the system. 
Portfolio Model 
A portfolio R&D environment would enable mission-focused research and rapid 
exploitation, both critical to maintaining technological superiority over adversaries. 
Establishing a long-term R&D environment for a portfolio would allow an active community 
to contribute to advancing innovative capabilities. Each portfolio could include government 
labs, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), universities, DoD 
University Aligned Research Centers (UARCs), and diverse industry players in a 
collaborative environment. Portfolios could include pools of industry players large and small, 
traditional defense contractors, and innovative new entrants (see Figure 4). An open 
innovation culture would pursue ideas across contractors, partners, users, and even 
adversaries to shape R&D goals (Kelley, 2010). Both government and industry could 
contribute R&D funding to portfolio solutions and share intellectual property when 
appropriate. They would also make long-term investments in M&S, experimentation, and 
rapid testing capabilities. Portfolio leaders would provide their priorities for research and 
feedback to shape investments and determine which technologies to integrate into the next 
program. R&D organizations focused on technology maturity would reduce program risk and 
improve delivery speed. 
 
 
As the DoD would increasingly rely on commercial technologies rather than military-
unique developments, portfolios would make long-term investments in assessing current 
and emerging technologies. A portfolio R&D group knowledgeable about technology 
solutions would intelligently shape operations, requirements, and designs. This group would 
demonstrate capabilities, prototype emerging technologies, and compete in challenges to 
achieve performance goals. Robust M&S capabilities and experimentation would evolve, 
drawing on the latest technologies and threat assessments. Given the current era of 
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Huge, monolithic MDAPs develop all CDD requirements in a single, big-bang 
approach. MDAPs take 10 to 15 years from Milestone A to initial operational capability, with 
many of the largest systems taking even longer. Programs enter EMD with immature 
technologies, which leads to design instability, technical challenges, and significant cost and 
schedule overruns. Lengthy timelines between deliveries drive operational sponsors to add 
requirements to the scope of each increment, thereby compounding risks and increasing 
cost and schedule delays. For example, the F/A-22 took 22 years to become operational, 
with a 71% quantity decrease and 62% cost increase against initial plans. The Air Force 
could have delivered more capability sooner via a three-block incremental approach 
(Walker, 2013). The block upgrade model for B-52, F-15, and F-16 proved successful over 
decades, yet with its big-bang structure the F-35 program is struggling with costly retrofits. 
In the year 2054, the entire defense budget will buy just one tactical aircraft 
… which will have to be shared by the Navy and the Air Force 6 months each 
year, with the Marine Corps borrowing it on the extra day during leap years. 
—Augustine’s Law XVI (Augustine, 2015) 
Portfolio Model  
Given competing missions, priorities, budgets, authorities, and many other factors, 
designing any element across platforms has historically added risk across programs, 
particularly joint programs. One of the biggest benefits of a portfolio structure would be the 
ability to design common platforms, subsystems, and services across programs. 
Stakeholders could shape these common elements to optimize portfolio performance, 
efficiencies, and mission impact.  
Portfolios would structure developments to deliver a continual set of capability 
releases via small programs or increments. Smaller programs carry lower risk because of 
their well-understood scope, simpler design, more accurate cost/schedule estimates, and 
rapid delivery of capabilities. Speed reduces exposure to change and aligns requirements 
and capabilities delivered.  
As illustrated in Figure 5, portfolios would scope each program or increment by 
leveraging the highest priority portfolio requirements and mature technologies from the 
portfolio R&D environment. This would help programs to deliver capabilities within five years 
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For example, instead of designing C4ISR aircraft independently, the DoD could 
examine the viability of a common aircraft platform with a modular design to allow for a 
diverse set of payloads. Common vehicles, communication suites, sensors, or ground 
stations would improve interoperability and cost efficiencies. Common services from IT 
infrastructure networks to system sustainment could improve mission impact and lead to 
cost savings.  
Architectures 
Program Model 
Programs are designed individually and focus primarily on subsystem interfaces and 
performance. Each program develops a series of DoD Architecture Framework (DODAF) 
products to capture the capability, operational, services, and systems viewpoints 
(Winnefield, 2015). While these architecture products help programs to understand the 
bigger picture, designs remain program centric. A diverse set of defense industry contractors 
often integrates proprietary design elements, which creates risks to interoperability and 
system evolution. The maturity of architectures varies widely across the DoD, with few areas 
of a strong enterprise architecture driving program designs and interfaces. Programs have 
collaborated to jointly develop common subsystems, but often encountered considerable 
risk due to competing designs, distributed budgets, and cross-organizational dynamics. 
Many interfaces between systems are costly point-to-point designs difficult to evolve in a 
dynamic environment.  
Portfolio Model 
Establishing a portfolio for a mission area would provide a structure to develop and 
mature an effective enterprise architecture. Collaboratively developed and proven 
standards, interfaces, and processes would guide each program’s development. This 
strategic design approach would enable optimization in production, operations, and 
sustainment. A central portfolio authority for an enterprise architecture would ensure that 
new program designs leverage the architecture from the outset. Portfolios could more 
effectively design the modular open systems strongly advocated by Congress, the GAO, 
and the DoD’s Better Buying Power initiative (Kendall, 2014). Portfolio systems engineers 
would develop notional designs for each acquisition program using mature technologies 
from the portfolio’s development environment to address the top capability gaps identified in 
the relevant ICD. Robust portfolio enterprise architectures and collaboratively developed 
notional designs would outline how each capability fits within the portfolio suite. Portfolios 
would resist over-engineering complex architectures by driving simplicity and maximizing 
use of commercial technologies.  
Strategies 
Program Model 
Major acquisition programs develop dozens of documents to support major milestone 
decisions. On average, programs take over two years to complete milestone documents, 
expending an average of 5,600 staff days (Sullivan, 2015). These documents force the 
program office to explore effective strategies for the next acquisition phase, yet the sheer 
quantity and complexity become overwhelming. As conditions change during the acquisition 
phase, programs rarely update strategy documents and resubmit them for approval. In 
short, program strategies are shortsighted and often do not reflect current approaches. 
Lengthy program strategies simply gather dust in file cabinets. “Working without a plan may 
seem scary, but blindly following a plan that has no relationship to reality is even scarier” 
(Fried & Hansson, 2010). 
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After awarding the contract, agencies are often locked into a single vendor for the 
program life. This eliminates competition—the single best method to control costs and 
improve performance.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio strategies would provide a long-term vision of how to deliver an integrated 
suite of capabilities most effectively and efficiently. The vision would include a clear set of 
portfolio goals, outcomes, risks, and performance measures. Unifying around an inspiring 
vision or challenge would provide clarity on investment decisions and rally a diverse 
community to develop innovative solutions. Portfolios should embrace LinkedIn’s CEO Reid 
Hoffman’s two rules for strategy decisions: speed and simplicity (Casnocha, 2015). 
Consistent, repeatable processes across programs would foster a dynamic 
workforce, accelerate program execution, and allow for tailoring as necessary. Portfolio 
documentation would serve as the foundation for each program, thus reducing the amount 
of program-unique content to develop and coordinate. Common portfolio strategies and 
practices would ensure that each program leverages best practices and provide new 
programs an established framework on which to build.  
Portfolio strategies would take industry considerations into account to optimize 
production lines across systems and foster an active, competitive environment. Integrating 
OSD/AT&L’s Sector-by-Sector, Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) industrial base analysis into program 
strategies would support a vibrant supply chain and affordable, stable development and 
production rates (Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy [MIBP], n.d.). Strategies would 
explore innovative approaches to nurture an active industry community in R&D and in 
program development/production, and would consider sponsoring competitions to address 
critical risks or opportunities. Strategies could encompass more dual awards, split buys, and 
parallel developments to keep participants in an active contractor base leapfrogging each 
other with evolutionary upgrades or new, revolutionary solutions. 
Contracting 
Program Model 
Contracting today involves a set of lengthy processes, with source selections that 
often take a year or more to complete. The contractor or contractor team selected to design 
and develop a new system often gains monopolistic power over the government for a 
majority of a program’s life span. As the DoD has moved toward acquiring larger and fewer 
major systems, this has changed the dynamics of the defense industry. Instead of creating a 
steady pipeline of potential work through periodic competition for new work, many of these 
large contracts become all-or-nothing, make-or-break outcomes that shape a major market 
segment for a decade or longer. 
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio contracting would focus on developing active, long-term partnerships with 
many companies rather than only a few. The goal would be to build a vibrant community of 
large and small companies actively contributing to R&D, architectures, designs, 
development, production, and sustainment of portfolio capabilities.  
Competition remains the best way to drive down costs and increase innovation in 
defense programs. Therefore, a portfolio strategy should actively foster continuous 
competition over a program’s life cycle via broad industry participation. Decomposing large 
systems into a smaller set of programs would increase opportunities for industry, especially 
small businesses, to compete for DoD work. A potential portfolio contract strategy could use 
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multiple-award, Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts to establish targeted 
pools of large and small businesses with key technological and domain expertise. 
The DoD could streamline contract timelines by establishing portfolio contracts with 
standardized business practices and pre-competed contract vehicles to enable rapid 
generation of task orders for programs and increments. Standardized business practices 
would include pricing, terms and conditions, templates, and selection criteria. Portfolios 
could maintain continuous competition by restricting the size of the contract vehicles with on 
and off ramps to refresh the vendor pools. Past performance on task orders within the 
portfolio would represent a valuable selection criterion for future work, as it would reward 
superior performance by contractors. 
A portfolio approach should incentivize innovative companies to pursue defense 
work. New entrants, more than the major defense companies, offer the greatest promise for 
designing and integrating technologies in new ways to achieve a military advantage. The 
DoD has a variety of contracting programs to reach companies willing to offer new 
technologies, collaborative research, and experimentation. Broad Area Announcements 
(BAAs) foster competition to advance state of the art research and prototypes. Small 
Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
programs fund cooperative R&D projects with small businesses and universities (DCAA, 
n.d.). Portfolios could provide these small companies with an environment to prototype and 
demonstrate a focused set of capabilities tightly aligned with an operational mission. 
Promising small businesses could partner with established defense companies to navigate 
the DoD’s regulatory gauntlet to develop and produce a new system.  
Roadmaps 
Program Model 
Each program must develop and maintain a strategic schedule and detailed 
integrated master schedule (IMS). The quality of program schedules often increases in the 
lead-up to major milestones, while dropping off during acquisition phases. Detailed IMSs 
should integrate government and contractor activities, yet are often managed as contractor 
deliverables. Some operations, acquisition, and budget headquarters may have roadmaps 
or enterprise view of program schedules, yet the underlying data often lacks sufficient fidelity 
or currency.  
Portfolio Model 
A portfolio roadmap such as the one shown in Figure 6 would serve as a central, 
long-range planning tool for operations, acquisitions, and budget domains and include the 
following: 
 Schedules of all legacy systems and planned programs/capabilities 
 Quantities of operational systems and new production planned 
 Identification of gaps, overlaps, and migrations from legacy to modern 
systems 
 Current and projected performance levels for systems or mission areas 
 Identification of legacy system risks due to technical factors, sources, or O&S 
costs 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=`Ü~åÖÉ= - 261 - 
 
 
Portfolio roadmaps would provide operational, acquisition, and budget leaders and 
stakeholders with an integrated plan. They would support collaboration across these 
domains on status, risks, and plans, and foster discussions on priorities. Identifying risks or 
gaps would support decisions on accelerating new systems, delaying retirement of legacy 
systems, or implementing interim fixes. Aligning roadmaps with portfolio cost estimates and 
budgets would enable portfolios to optimize investments, ideally supported by analytical 
tools and methods. Many leading schedule software products already enable linking of 
program schedules. A portfolio schedule framework that integrates program dependencies 
would show the impacts of program schedule slips and support scenario planning.  
Governance 
Program Model 
Governance presents one of the biggest challenges to effective portfolio 
management. Different stakeholder organizations across domains and levels have a 
competing set of priorities, incentives, cultures, and constraints. PEOs oversee the 
execution of the individual programs in their portfolio, but dedicate little time and resources 
to cross-program integration and optimization. The larger the portfolio, the harder it is to 
manage. Each layer of oversight across requirements, acquisition, and budget communities 
and functions groups programs differently, with little alignment around common portfolios. In 
some instances up to 56 organizations at eight levels reviewed program milestone 
documentation (Sullivan, 2015). With no two portfolios the same, it is difficult to reach 
consensus across communities on program priorities and budgets. The DoD incentivizes 
program managers to ensure that their program delivers the required performance within 
cost and on schedule. External dependencies are seen as risks. Therefore, many PEOs 
believe that the best way to minimize risk consists of scoping each program to include its 
own infrastructure as well as all subsystems and support equipment. Each program then 
progresses through the acquisition life cycle on an individual schedule and meets with its 
Milestone Decision Authority only at major milestones.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolios would govern through collaborative, strategic partnerships with five key 
elements:  
 Shared responsibilities of operational, acquisition, budget, and sustainment 
executives 
 Portfolio alignment to ensure stakeholders represent the same mix of 
programs 
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 Decision authorities delegated to the appropriate level to enable timely 
decisions  
 Central knowledge repository to provide stakeholder transparency and 
leadership insight 
 Incentives aligned to ensure all organizations are working to common 
outcomes 
Carefully limiting portfolio scope would ensure a manageable governance level. 
Program managers should be empowered to make decisions about technologies and 
subsystems (Berteau, 2014). Regular discussions among a diverse stakeholder group on 
priorities, status, risks, resources, and opportunities would ensure that the pipeline of 
programs supports the desired portfolio outcomes. Partnerships between operational 
commands and acquisition portfolios would foster collaboration on operational details and 
on which technologies/capabilities can be rapidly tailored for their missions. The partners 
would have wide latitude to shape the program scope and features.  
Portfolio charters would clearly define authorities, roles, and responsibilities. Online 
repositories would capture and share portfolio knowledge to provide real-time insight and a 
common understanding. Embracing a servant leadership mindset would foster program 
support, integration, and innovation. Robust portfolio analytics would enable the data-driven 
decisions essential in these complex environments.  
Governance would balance gate-check reviews (e.g., milestones) with time-phased 
portfolio and program reviews. Establishing a battle rhythm to discuss program status, 
issues, and ways ahead would minimize the burdens imposed by major milestone reviews. 
Portfolio strategy documents would reduce the burden on programs by requiring only 
constrained annexes that contain program-unique information. Reviews would still take 
place to ensure programs have a sound enough strategy and mitigated risks to warrant 
entry into and funding for the next acquisition phase. With delegated authorities, common 
processes, and regular insight, programs would minimize the documentation and reviews 
required to make informed decisions.  
Budgets 
Program Model 
Historically, the DoD programs with the largest budgets have been the most likely to 
overrun costs and fail to deliver capabilities, while those with the smallest budgets were 
most likely to underrun cost and exceed performance expectations (Ward, 2014). Most 
acquisition programs today are funded via budget accounts called program elements (PEs), 
which are outlined in the president’s budget to Congress and included in the annual 
appropriations bills. Funding for each program is closely monitored by Congress, the DoD 
comptroller, each service and agency, and the program managers. PEs often fail to provide 
Congress with consistent, complete, and clear information (Sullivan, 2007). The lengthy 
DoD Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process requires budget 
requests and approvals years before programs are executed, with frequent adjustments 
made each year. The biggest challenge posed by the current budget constraints involves 
responsiveness to changes in operations, threats, opportunities, program performance, and 
priorities. Transfers of funds between PEs are limited to 10% of the budget for the current 
execution year, with congressional approval needed for larger transfers.  
Portfolio Model 
Some PEs today include multiple programs, with each broken out at a subaccount 
level called a budget program activity code (BPAC). Transferring funds between BPACs 
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requires lower approval thresholds than transfers between entire PEs. Thus, allocating a 
portfolio budget at the PE level with programs at the BPAC level would offer funding 
flexibility and agility, while also providing sufficient transparency to oversight officials. 
This funding approach would increase the effective use of constrained resources and 
would direct funds toward the highest-priority capabilities with the greatest enterprise 
impact. Pentagon executives would focus on strategic budget allocations at the portfolio 
level. Portfolio stakeholders would allocate program funding following key milestone 
reviews. Portfolio managers would then establish funding lines for technology development, 
enterprise platforms, and personnel for enterprise efficiencies. Fortunately, such a change 
would not require a wholesale restructuring of the PPBE process but would simply call for 
shaping a few PEs for an initial set of portfolios.  
Workforce 
Program Model 
Program office staff are often assigned to a single effort for an extended period of 
time, limiting their exposure to and experience with other programs or DoD-wide procedures 
and often leading to atrophy of their skills. Military personnel rotate every three to four years, 
with program management turnover frequently highlighted as a systemic program risk. While 
stability of key leadership positions can be beneficial, an inflexible staffing model that ties 
staff to a program for a decade is grossly inefficient and ineffective.  
Hundreds of acquisition programs go through roughly the same major acquisition 
processes, yet often reinvent the wheel each time rather than tailoring a common approach 
to program specifics. As a result, a program planning for a major event—for example, a 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR)—may have few staff with recent PDR experience, and 
most staff may need to relearn some of the key elements to prepare for and execute the 
PDR.  
Portfolio Model 
Programs and acquisition workforces would perform more efficiently and effectively 
in a portfolio matrix organization. In an era of budget and workforce challenges, a dynamic 
staffing model would yield cost efficiencies, a strengthened workforce, and improved 
program outcomes.  
Each program would have a balance of long-term staff with deep historical program 
knowledge and technical and process subject matter experts (SMEs) dynamically assigned 
throughout the program’s life cycle. In a portfolio structure, individual programs or 
increments would have shorter durations, which itself would reduce the skill decay that can 
result from lengthy program assignments.  
In a portfolio matrix model, a percentage of the workforce could serve as process or 
technical experts who augment program office staff via short-term assignments. Process 
experts, for example engineers who specialize in system design, could advise program 
offices in the preparation and execution of PDRs and Critical Design Reviews and their 
associated design drawings. Schedule experts could assist in development and 
implementation of integrated master schedules to effectively manage the program and its 
dependencies on external efforts. Market research or commercial technology experts could 
ensure programs have a sound understanding of market offerings and technology solutions 
to shape the program scope and strategies.  
Technical experts, by contrast, would offer deep insight in particular technical 
domains (e.g., avionics, sensors, stealth, or cyber). As programs progress through the 
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acquisition life cycle, these SMEs would phase in and out of the program office as 
conditions warrant. Using expertise only when required, instead of committing personnel to 
long-term assignments while demand for specialized skills ebbs and flows, would provide an 
optimal staffing model. SMEs could support multiple programs at the same time, thus 
establishing repeatable processes and horizontal integration across the portfolio.  
Process and technology SMEs would focus on mastering their niche areas by 
collaborating with other SMEs across the DoD. Process SMEs would develop and maintain 
guides, templates, and repeatable processes for easy program adoption. Technology SMEs 
would research and collaborate with labs, FFRDCs, and industry in a focused technology 
domain to support program designs and innovative solutions. As staff members progress 
through their careers, they could transition between program and process focused roles.  
Sustainment 
Program Model 
Government depots and prime contractors sustain the DoD’s weapon systems 
following a variety of operational models. Related major programs in a similar mission area 
are often sustained at diverse locations across the country, leading to massive inefficiencies 
in facilities, personnel, and support equipment.  
Portfolio Model 
Portfolio enterprise architectures and designs would enable strategic sustainment 
strategies to leverage common subsystems, parts, and support services. Portfolio 
sustainment strategies would leverage economies of scale via strategic investments and 
operations. Designing a holistic approach to sustaining portfolio capabilities would enable 
government and industry to make smarter long-term capital investments for production and 
sustainment. Subdividing monolithic systems into capability suites would create a smaller, 
steady pipeline of new systems to sustain. An enterprise analysis of costs, benefits, and 
risks could support a balanced portfolio of leasing versus buying solutions. Portfolios could 
establish public–private partnerships across programs, considering resources, demand, and 
expertise. Portfolio-level sustainment performance metrics and measures could incentivize 
industry to move from system-specific measures toward integrated mission-area capability 
rates.  
Summary 
Acquisition programs today are burdened by the complexity of the acquisition 
environment, the difficulty of maturing critical technologies, and the inability of the 
acquisition system to respond to changing operations, technologies, and budgets. 
Budgetary, workforce, and regulatory constraints further compound program risk. In a 
complex, integrated environment, defense acquisitions can no longer rely on a structure 
based on individual systems. Embracing a capability-focused portfolio structure modeled on 
the commercial sector offers many solutions to the DoD’s top challenges.  
The principles of simplicity, commonality, and agility should guide all acquisition 
portfolios. By adopting the commercial product-line approach, the DoD could address long-
standing acquisition issues associated with speed, resilience, and interoperability. Elevating 
the time-consuming acquisition processes to the portfolio level would reduce program 
workload, allowing each program to deliver products faster. Managing requirements, 
budgets, and staffs at the portfolio level would enable dynamic allocation to high-priority 
programs. Portfolio strategies, roadmaps, and architectures would guide program 
development. 
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In a portfolio structure, an active government and industry community would 
collaboratively develop technologies and designs and employ continuous competition to 
develop and produce the individual systems. Portfolios would design and optimize 
acquisition processes to deliver a suite of smaller programs rapidly, ensuring that 
warfighters regularly receive integrated, incremental capabilities with the latest technologies 
designed to achieve operational missions. 
Advancing a portfolio model will require the DoD to address various strategic 
challenges. Congress maintains strict control over program budgets and location of depots 
to sustain systems. Reaching agreement between the DoD and Congress on the proper 
balance of insight, authorities, and accountabilities will take time. Each functional area (e.g., 
requirements, systems engineering, testing) would require tailored processes and possibly 
new policies to enable portfolio strategies, and the DoD would need to identify which suite of 
programs would comprise the initial portfolios. Finally, the culture of the acquisition 
workforce would have to shift to support a new portfolio acquisition model. With forward-
thinking acquisition leaders in place across the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, the DoD has a 
prime opportunity to pursue a portfolio acquisition model that can achieve transformational 
solutions.   
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